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FINTECH AND ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
REGULATION: IMPLEMENTING AN
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
HIERARCHY PREMISED ON
FINANCIAL INNOVATION
by: Nicholas Roide*
ABSTRACT
Innovations in financial technology (“fintech”) have rippling effects across
global markets. Fintech firms utilizing virtual assets and disintermediating
blockchain technology continue to rapidly grow in strength and number. As
systemic risk mounts due to the inter-jurisdictional nature of fintech, antimoney laundering (“AML”) regulators must search for an international answer to maintain global financial stability and protect consumers against illicit
activities. A variety of solutions have appeared within local AML regulatory
frameworks. These frameworks tend to function as a hierarchy with three ordered objectives: market integrity, rule clarity, and innovation. However,
frameworks often place too much emphasis on market integrity and squeeze
out the financial innovation inherent in the fintech sector. This Comment argues for an international AML regulatory hierarchy that places paramount
importance on the innovative nature of fintech yet still promotes market
integrity.
This Comment examines the efficacy of this proposed hierarchy through the
AML regulatory frameworks of several offshore financial centers (“OFCs”):
Malta, Gibraltar, and Jersey. While OFCs have often been accused of lighttouch regulation, they are championing a push into financial innovation with
strong regulatory safeguards that maintain market integrity and guard against
systemic risk. These AML regulatory frameworks provide support for the
Comment’s central argument. The Comment concludes with an examination
of methods by which the proposed hierarchy can be implemented. Ultimately,
innovation hubs nurture regulatory learning and allow regulators to employ a
conglomeration of initiatives such as regulatory sandboxes and mentorship
regimes, which can be macro-produced to attain the desired hierarchical
outcome.
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INTRODUCTION

Financial technology (“fintech”) has fundamentally changed the
landscape of the financial sector in recent years. Fintech firms, everincreasing in number, are using disintermediating blockchain technology and virtual asset transactions to attain an efficient and innovative
advantage over traditional banks and investment firms.1 Consider the
following: Robinhood, a commission-free stock trading startup that
lists cryptocurrencies, has a current valuation of $40 billion.2 Stripe, a
company offering digital payment processing software, has announced
an acquisition of Nigerian fintech company Paystack for around $200
million to expand into the African market.3 And BlockFi, a cryptocurrency lending firm, has increased its private valuation target from $435
million to $3 billion.4 The use of blockchain technology and virtual
1. See Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products, Intermediation and Markets- Policy Implications for Financial Regulators, 21 J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 55, 58–59 (2016).
2. John Detrixhe, Robinhood Shares Are Soaring Just Like the Stocks That Trade
on Robinhood, QUARTZ (Feb. 11, 2021), https://qz.com/1971633/robinhood-pre-iposecondary-shares-signal-40-billion-valuation/ [https://perma.cc/6AGB-EWTC].
3. Ingrid Lunden, Stripe Acquires Nigeria’s Paystack for $200M+ to Expand into
the African Continent, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 15, 2020, 7:22 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/15/stripe-acquires-nigerias-paystack-for-200m-to-expand-intothe-african-continent/ [https://perma.cc/UY3A-R4DX].
4. Nina Bambysheva, BlockFi Gets a $3 Billion Valuation with New $350 Million
Series D Funding, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
ninabambysheva/2021/03/11/blockfi-gets-a-3-billion-valuation-with-new-350-millionseries-d-funding/?sh=3e85bf8b58a5 [https://perma.cc/A67M-SHLV].
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asset transactions as an innovative tool to establish market advantage
has become both pervasive and global.
But the burgeoning wave of technology-enabled financial services
also presents regulatory issues of systemic risk, consumer protection,
and financial stability on a global scale.5 For example, the German
fintech giant Wirecard, an international mobile payment and e-commerce service provider, is currently under investigation for the suspected money laundering of $2.1 billion.6 A primary concern, among
others outside the scope of this Comment, is that fintech firms may act
outside the purview of existing anti-money laundering (“AML”) legislation and regulation.7 As fintech firms eliminate the need for professional intermediaries, such as banks and others in the financial sector,
these firms may not be subject to the same financial reporting rules
that would regularly promote market stability.8 However, by the same
token, subjecting fintech to these stringent rules may lead to the collapse of many innovative fintech startups.9 The growth of innovation
and disruption in fintech leaves regulatory agencies searching for an
inter-jurisdictional answer to avoid global systemic risk while still
maintaining market innovation.
This Comment poses three central questions: (1) What challenges
do AML regulators face when regulating virtual asset service providers that utilize disintermediating blockchain technology, and what is
the current local and international regulatory response; (2) why is an
international AML regulatory hierarchy that fosters innovation but
still maintains market integrity needed for the future of the fintech
sector; and (3) how can this regulatory hierarchy actually be implemented? Thus, this Comment’s main purpose is to argue for the following international AML regulatory hierarchy, ordered from top to
bottom: innovation, market integrity, and rule clarity. This framework
is examined in the context of different AML regulatory regimes to
establish innovation as the key regulatory objective in the inherently
innovative fintech sector.
What are the challenges that fintech poses for AML regulatory regimes? Banks and other traditional financial institutions act as professional intermediaries, facilitating an efficient allocation of funds across
the financial supply chain between two parties through information
exchange, asset securitization transformation, and efficiency transfor5. See William Magnuson, Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era, 23 STAN. J.L.,
BUS. & FIN. 159, 184 (2018).
6. Jörn Poltz, German Prosecutors Open Wirecard Money Laundering Probe,
REUTERS (July 9, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wirecard-accounts-probe/german-prosecutors-open-wirecard-money-laundering-probeidUSKBN24A1EH [https://perma.cc/8YN9-BEUC].
7. Yen-Te Wu, FinTech Innovation and Anti-Money Laundering Compliance, 12
NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 201, 207 (2017).
8. See id.
9. Id.
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mation.10 Financial regulation of these intermediaries promotes financial market stability and consumer/investor protection.11 By contrast,
fintech firms’ use of blockchain introduces disintermediation into financial transactions by bypassing existing intermediary structures.12 In
essence, blockchain technology allows connected computers in a peerto-peer network to reach agreement over shared data.13 Since fintech
firms often disintermediate discrete parts of the financial supply chain
rather than the whole, regulators are faced with the challenge of combating systemic risk involved in myriad structural changes to existing
mechanisms.14 Although the scope of fintech disintermediation is
wide, this Comment narrows its focus on virtual asset transactions,
blockchain technology, and their association with AML regulatory
regimes.
Current local and international regulatory responses take shape in a
variety of forms. Their regulatory methodology can be analyzed from
a framework that has been dubbed the “innovation trilemma.”15 In
the context of fintech regulatory rulemaking, there are three foundational objectives: market integrity, rules simplicity, and financial innovation.16 However, under the trilemma theory, regulators are only
able to achieve one or sometimes two of these three objectives.17 Most
local and international AML regulatory standards mainly function
with the paramount objective of preserving market integrity.18 As a
result, innovation is often squeezed out.19 To combat this issue, this
Comment argues for an international regulatory hierarchy that places
paramount importance on innovation but guards against systemic risk.
10. See Fatjon Kaja et al., FinTech and the Law & Economics of Disintermediation
2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 540/2020, 2020), https://
ecgi.global/working-paper/fintech-and-law-economics-disintermediation [https://
perma.cc/T6F7-LJVS]; see Chiu, supra note 1, at 83–84.
11. See JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 16–17
(2016).
12. Chiu, supra note 1, at 85.
13. Peter Van Valkenburgh, What’s a Blockchain, Anyway?, COIN CTR. (Apr. 25,
2017), https://www.coincenter.org/education/blockchain-101/whats-a-blockchain/
[https://perma.cc/D6CH-3D28].
14. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107
GEO. L.J. 235, 277–78 (2019).
15. Id. at 244.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See generally FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, (June 2021), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/
fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67UT-CLU4] (listing the Financial Action Task Force’s standards for
preventing money laundering and terrorist financing from affecting the global financial system).
19. Asheesh Birla, The Biden Administration Can Change the World with New
Crypto Regulations, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 23, 2020, 12:08 PM), https://techcrunch.com/
2020/12/23/the-biden-administration-can-change-the-world-with-new-crypto-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/2XKQ-H9JZ].
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Why is an international AML regulatory hierarchy premised on innovation so important? The fintech sector is inherently innovative.
Fintech firms continue to expand the applications of blockchain technology and other financial services to compete with traditional financial institutions.20 A whopping 19 companies on the 2020 Forbes list of
the 50 most innovative fintech firms were newcomers.21 And every
one of these fintech firms make using financial services more efficient,
cheaper, and easier.22 Because of the sector’s innovative nature,
fintech firms will continually seek a regulatory space that emphasizes
growth. Further, the future uses of blockchain technology—especially
in emerging markets—have the capacity to revolutionize financial
transactions, which in turn would further financial competition and
market growth. The proposed international AML hierarchy is needed
to address the inherently innovative nature of fintech and ensure future financial development.
The efficacy of the proposed hierarchy and justification for an innovative approach is examined through the lens of several established
offshore financial centers (“OFCs”): Gibraltar, Malta, and Jersey.
These jurisdictions are popularly known as “tax havens” and are often
mischaracterized as offering “light-touch regulation.”23 Onshore competitors often suggest that OFCs’ regulatory efforts are inadequate to
safeguard against fraud, money laundering, and corruption.24 However, it may be surprising to note that OFCs generally exert the same
or more regulatory efforts than onshore competitors.25 As bastions of
offshore financing, OFCs have engaged in efforts to become leading
hubs for blockchain technology.26 These jurisdictions have recently
been referred to as “blockchain havens”—a switch from their earlier
“tax haven” moniker—because of their leadership in blockchain technology development.27 As such, OFCs have engaged in substantive
AML legislation and regulation to both entice fintech firms and maintain regulatory compliance.28 Because these jurisdictions seek to spur
innovation while maintaining market integrity, they provide an excel20. See Michael del Castillo et al., The Forbes Fintech 50: The Most Innovative
Fintech Companies in 2020, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/fintech/2020/#443fdcce4acd [https://perma.cc/PH44-CZKT]; see
Danda B. Rawat et al., Blockchain Technology: Emerging Applications and Use Cases
for Secure and Trustworthy Smart Systems, 1 J. CYBERSECURITY & PRIV. 4, 4–5, 8–14
(2020).
21. del Castillo et al., supra note 20.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Omri Marian, Blockchain Havens and the Need for Their Internationally-Coordinated Regulation, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 529, 531–32 (2019).
24. See Andrew P. Morriss & Clifford C. Henson, Regulatory Effectiveness & Offshore Financial Centers, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 417, 422 (2013).
25. Id. at 454.
26. Marian, supra note 23, at 530.
27. Id. at 532.
28. See discussion infra Section III.B.
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lent example to expound on the efficacy of this Comment’s proposed
regulatory hierarchy.
How can an international AML regulatory hierarchy premised on
innovation actually be implemented? Implementation requires both a
local and an international response. Some jurisdictions use standalone innovative initiatives that include regulatory sandboxes,
mentorship programs, and fintech charters. Regulatory sandboxes cultivate a safe zone that allow fintech firms to test new innovations and
proactively prevent unknown risks in emerging technologies.29 And
fintech-bank mentorship arrangements allow firms to take advantage
of banking infrastructure to foster innovative services while partnered
banks are able to gain access to new markets.30 However, while these
types of initiatives can spur innovation, they have a number of drawbacks and deficiencies—especially in regulatory learning between
fintech firms and regulators.31
The use of local and international innovation hubs can provide a
solution. Innovation hubs provide a point of contact for fintech firms
to engage with regulators, discuss innovations, gain regulatory guidance, and recognize adjustment through collaboration.32 Stand-alone
initiatives like regulatory sandboxes and mentorship regimes are just
one kind of tool innovation hubs can employ to produce a wellrounded, innovative ecosystem premised on regulatory learning.33
OFCs provide an excellent framework to observe how an innovation
hub can be locally employed. And from an international standpoint,
the Global Financial Innovation Network (“GFIN”), a multinational
innovation hub,34 is in the best position to implement the proposed
international regulatory hierarchy going forward.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. In Part II, the Comment provides an overview of disintermediating fintech and the current challenges AML regulators face when creating a regime that addresses
systemic danger while still fostering innovation. The Comment then
examines the current local and international AML regulatory
frameworks through the lens of the innovation trilemma. Current
frameworks place paramount importance on systemic integrity but
squeeze out innovation and ignore the cross-border ramifications of
29. Michael M. Piri, Note, The Changing Landscapes of FinTech and RegTech:
Why the United States Should Create a Federal Regulatory Sandbox, 2 BUS. & FIN. L.
REV. 233, 246 (2019).
30. Luca Enriques & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Bank-Fintech Partnerships, Outsourcing
Arrangements and the Case for a Mentorship Regime 2–3 (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 572/2020, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3625578 [https://perma.cc/2QUY-TE24].
31. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
32. Ross P. Buckley et al., Building Fintech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes,
Innovation Hubs and Beyond, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 58 (2020).
33. Id. at 59.
34. About GFIN, GLOB. FIN. INNOVATION NETWORK, https://www.thegfin.com/
about [https://perma.cc/XB9K-HQEP].
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the fintech industry. In Part III, the Comment argues for an international AML regulatory hierarchy that places paramount importance
on innovation yet still promotes systemic integrity. This hierarchy is
necessary because the fintech sector is inherently innovative and its
future applications promote global financial growth. The efficacy of
this hierarchy is displayed through the AML regulatory regimes of
three well-established OFCs: Malta, Gibraltar, and Jersey. The Comment concludes in Part IV by examining how to implement the proposed regulatory hierarchy with the use of innovation hubs locally and
internationally.
II. FINTECH

INTERNATIONAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE

AND THE

What challenges do AML regulators face when regulating fintech,
and what is the current local and international regulatory response?
This Part provides a background of the current challenges faced by
regulators seeking to impose AML regulations on discrete parts of the
fundamentally innovative fintech sector. The sector implicates crossborder economic interdependencies, as evidenced by the global economic consequences from the COVID pandemic.35 Financial shocks
reverberate across national boundaries.36 Further, the sector is innovative in essence, displayed by the dramatic rise of cryptocurrencies
and the utilization of fintech by developing countries in Africa and
Latin America to gain a financial foothold in the advancing world.37
Thus, the globalized, innovative nature of fintech underscores the
need for an international AML financial regulatory framework that
remedies issues domestic financial regulators cannot reach
themselves.38
The most prominent AML regulatory obstacles stem from fintech
firms’ use of blockchain technology, a process of disintermediation
and decentralization that bypasses existing intermediary infrastructure
to produce improved efficiency and cost reduction.39 While fintech
firms’ use of blockchain can deliver productivity gains, this burgeoning method of financial transaction technology is also character35. Yesha Yadav, Fintech and International Financial Regulation, 53 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1109, 1117 (2020).
36. Christine Lagarde, A Regulatory Approach to Fintech, STRAIGHT TALK, June
2018, at 10, http://governance40.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/straight-fintecLagarde.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q54-8Z48].
37. DOUGLAS MILLER ET AL., INT’L FIN. CORP., BLOCKCHAIN: OPPORTUNITIES
FOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS 7, (Jan. 2019) https://www.ifc.org/
wps/wcm/connect/2106d1c6-5361-41cd-86c2-f7d16c510e9f/201901-IFC-EMCompassBlockchain-Report.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=MXYj-sA [https://perma.cc/
LW3Z-LFLN].
38. See Yadav, supra note 35, at 1118.
39. MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 14.
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ized by features of diffusion, automation, and adaptation.40 This
means fintech firms utilizing blockchain are often small and entrepreneurial in nature, they rely on algorithmic operational functions,
and they can easily change structure or strategy in response to external circumstances.41
In turn, AML regulators face many challenges: guarding against systemic risk, maintaining consumer protection, preserving global financial stability, and addressing issues on a multinational level with
marked differences in national market structure.42 In addition, fintech
regulators face a policy trilemma.43 According to the innovation
trilemma theory, regulators can only achieve two out of the following
three objectives: market integrity, financial innovation, and rules simplicity.44 As this Part notes, these three objectives form a regulatory
hierarchy.
Currently, AML regulators around the globe employ this regulatory
hierarchy in several different forms.45 But most of these regulatory
frameworks have a paramount objective: market integrity.46 This
makes sense; the main priority of financial regulation is to guard
against challenges stated in the preceding paragraph, namely, systemic
risk, consumer protection, and global financial stability.47 But fintech
firms that specialize in virtual asset transactions utilizing blockchain
do not know the rules of the game they are playing.48 AML regulation
is either entirely unclear or too stringent depending on the jurisdiction. As a result, financial innovation that benefits market competition
and growth is often stifled.49 Thus, the background provided in this
Part culminates into the Comment’s central argument and proposal: a
new hierarchy premised on innovation is needed to implement an international AML regulatory regime.
It should be helpful to note the limits of this discussion. First,
“fintech” is often broadly defined as any use of technology in applica40. Magnuson, supra note 5, at 163.
41. See id.
42. See generally Schan Duff, The New Financial Stability Regulation, 23 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 46 (2018) (discussing financial stability, theories of financial instability, the structure of financial regulation, and the U.S. financial stability architecture);
ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 11 (discussing the underlying principles of financial
regulation).
43. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 14, at 242.
44. Id. at 244.
45. Id. at 282.
46. See Chiu, supra note 1, at 63 (explaining that regulators often take a cautious
approach to not impede innovative competition or consumer choice).
47. See generally Duff, supra note 42 (discussing financial stability, theories of financial instability, the structure of financial regulation, and the U.S. financial stability
architecture); ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 11 (discussing the underlying principles of
financial regulation).
48. Birla, supra note 19.
49. See Lagarde, supra note 36, at 10.
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tion to finance.50 However, in this discussion, the term is defined more
narrowly in conjunction with the use of blockchain technology. While
startups specializing in financial technology have been present for
many decades (e.g., the establishment of PayPal, originally Confinity,
in 1998),51 the first use of blockchain technology appeared in 2009 in
the form of Bitcoin, a peer-to-peer (“P2P”) cryptocurrency system
created by Satoshi Nakamoto.52 This discussion focuses on fintech
firms operating within the blockchain. Second, while blockchain technology generally underpins the function of cryptocurrencies, the technology itself has many other uses along the virtual asset value chain
(P2P transfers in general, smart contracts, supply chain management,
security, etc.).53 Thus, while this discussion mainly focuses on virtual
asset transactions, it also encompasses the other uses of blockchain
technology. Finally, while regulatory efforts are widespread and varied in application, this Comment narrows its regulatory analysis to
AML regulation.
A. The Challenges of Regulating Fintech
Financial technological innovation is increasingly disruptive and unpredictable.54 One need only look at the rise of virtual assets as a
prime example of this notion. The creation of the cryptocurrency universe began in January 2009 with Bitcoin.55 In February 2011, Bitcoin
reached parity with the United States dollar.56 But just as a community of techno-libertarians began to view cryptocurrency as a potential
alternative to fiat currency, hackers stole around $460 million (744,408
Bitcoin) from Mt. Gox, the largest Bitcoin exchange in the world, in
February 2014.57 Despite a subsequent downturn, Bitcoin and competing cryptocurrencies managed to survive.58 A new cryptocurrency,
Ethereum, was launched in 2014 as a distributed computing platform
that expanded on the current payment system framework, allowing
for the creation of virtually any type of decentralized application (e.g.,
smart contracts).59 As a result of the expansive growth of cryptocurrencies in such a short amount of time, local and global regulatory
standard-setting authorities began to fear financing risks of money
50. See Douglas W. Arner et al., FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization
of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 373, 379 (2017).
51. Brian O’Connell, History of PayPal: Timeline and Facts, THESTREET (Aug. 26,
2019, 10:11 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/technology/history-of-paypal-15062744
[https://perma.cc/FJ6B-N6V3].
52. MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 10.
53. Id. at 11.
54. Lagarde, supra note 36, at 9.
55. David Sharifi, A History of Cryptocurrency, ITBIOMETRICS, https://itbiometrics.com/a-history-of-digital-currency/ [https://perma.cc/T5S2-LUXJ].
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 10.
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laundering and terrorism associated with virtual assets and virtual asset providers.60 Fintech firms’ use of virtual asset transactions has continued to the present where there are currently more than 2,000
tradable cryptocurrencies.61 And underlying almost all these virtual
assets is blockchain technology.62 But just what is blockchain technology, and why is it such a hot topic for AML regulators?
Confusion over the structure, utility, and applicability of blockchain
technology has persisted since its first use in 2009.63 Many still associate blockchain with Bitcoin despite the technology’s growth in the
past few years as a means for inter-organizational cooperation and
value transfer beyond cryptocurrency.64
At its core, blockchain allows connected computers in a P2P network to register and confirm asset transactions.65 Blockchain is a form
of distributed ledger technology where transactions are recorded on a
public ledger as “blocks” in a continuous chain linked to all previous
blocks, reaching all the way back to the original transaction.66 Once an
asset transaction is initiated, other participating computers on the network verify and authenticate blocks on a public ledger.67 These participating computers, termed “miners” or “nodes,” are incentivized to
perform authentication functions through token rewards.68 Timestamped records are then sequentially displayed to network parties
based on their access levels.69 Blockchain networks are either open
(permission-less)—anonymous and available for anyone to join—or
private (permissioned)—where different entities or individuals possess varying levels of authority to view information and conduct
transactions.70
Blockchain’s primary value lies in the technology’s emphasis on
consensus across a distributed network of parties in the public ledger,
“eliminat[ing] the need for a central authority or intermediary.”71 This
disintermediation—bypassing existing financial intermediary infrastructure—allows for faster and cheaper transactions.72
60. See generally FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, GUIDANCE FOR A RISK-BASED APVIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2015), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC56-6L2A]
(discussing the FATF’s concerns regarding money laundering and terrorism and suggesting a framework to prevent such activities in the context of internet-based payment systems).
61. Sharifi, supra note 55.
62. Id.
63. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 9.
64. Id.
65. Magnuson, supra note 5, at 170; see Van Valkenburgh, supra note 13.
66. MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 11–12.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id. at 11–12.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 10.
72. Lagarde, supra note 36, at 9.
PROACH
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Fintech firms that employ blockchain technology are generally characterized by three key features: diffusion, automation, and adaptation.73 In terms of diffusion, actors in the fintech market are
comprised of small, entrepreneurial startups rather than large companies.74 For instance, as noted above, thousands of cryptocurrencies
have been created since the advent of Bitcoin.75 In terms of automation, fintech firms using blockchain rely on integrated algorithms of
digital cryptography and distributed databases maintained by P2P networks to function.76 And in terms of adaptation, fintech firms have
shown a remarkable ability to use blockchain technology to create or
adapt in response to new market conditions and other external circumstances in a short amount of time.77 For example, with the emergence of Ethereum came the “smart contract” concept, a secondgeneration blockchain platform that “provid[ed] the ability to execute
more complex and sophisticated tasks among parties” based on
predefined contract rules embedded in code.78 In sum, these three key
features and the disintermediating quality of blockchain allow fintech
firms to contend with traditional financial institutions.79
However, these same features also represent the heart of the challenges AML regulators face in regulating fintech. First, because
fintech actors utilizing blockchain technology are highly diffused and
focused on discrete parts of the financial supply chain, they may be
more prone to economic shocks than larger financial institutions.80
And since blockchain technology is cross-jurisdictional by nature and
virtual assets know no borders, the economic shocks that fintech firms
suffer can reverberate globally.81 Second, because fintech firms rely
on automation for blockchain technology, these firms are essentially
tethered to the validity of the algorithm to function smoothly.82 While
well-designed distributed ledgers could actually improve AML compliance, the anonymity associated with public blockchains can be (and
has been) used for money laundering activities.83 Lastly, the adaptable
nature of fintech firms to changing market conditions means that
these companies are “notoriously volatile.”84 This volatility leaves
AML regulators struggling to provide stability.85
73. Magnuson, supra note 5, at 163.
74. Id. at 166.
75. Sharifi, supra note 55.
76. Magnuson, supra note 5, at 170.
77. Id. at 172.
78. See id.; MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 19.
79. Magnuson, supra note 5, at 163.
80. William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1200 (2018)
[hereinafter Regulating Fintech].
81. Lagarde, supra note 36.
82. See Magnuson, supra note 5, at 170.
83. MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 53.
84. Magnuson, supra note 5, at 174.
85. See id.
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These challenges are especially exacerbated when AML regulators
apply existing AML legislation to fintech. The disintermediating nature of fintech firms utilizing blockchain technology places firms
outside the confines of existing AML legislation and regulation because their operations are not contingent on financial reporting like
conventional intermediaries (like banks) in the sector.86 Fintech firms
may also operate independent of rules that regulate the general conduct of conventional banks.87 Thus, with the rise of initial coin offerings (“ICOs”) and speculation surrounding Bitcoin, regulators have to
take action to avoid the possibility of cryptocurrencies being used for
illicit ends.88 However, due to the innovative and adaptable nature of
these fintech firms, severely stringent rules may lead to the collapse of
those entrepreneurial companies and decrease competition in the
sector.89
In sum, AML regulators are faced with the challenge of combating
systemic risk, maintaining consumer protection, and fostering innovation in a cross-jurisdictional fintech sector. Finding the right balance
between risk mitigation and innovation is the key.90 If blockchain
technology is used to improve existing business processes, current legislation will probably suffice.91 However, disruptive cases arising out
of the fintech blockchain ecosystem with increasingly adaptive technology and business models will require new regulation geared toward
regulatory learning.92 Collaboration between regulators and the
fintech industry itself will be incredibly important to accommodate the
cross-border nature of the innovative technology.93
B. The Innovation Trilemma and the Need for a New Regulatory
Hierarchy
1. The Innovation Trilemma
Along with the regulatory challenges noted above, AML regulators
must also contend with the innovative nature of the fintech sector.94
As of the writing of this Comment, the cryptocurrency market has
exceeded a $1 trillion market cap95—a market that did not exist just
86. Wu, supra note 7, at 207.
87. Id.
88. MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 52.
89. Wu, supra note 7, at 207.
90. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 52.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Wu, supra note 7, at 250.
95. Bitcoin Surges Past $40,000 — Crypto Exceeds $1 Trillion Market Cap, FORBES
(Jan. 9, 2021, 2:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cryptoconfidential/2021/01/09/
bitcoin-surges-past-40000—crypto-exceeds-1-trillion-market-cap/?sh=236f2d864a3c
[https://perma.cc/GAZ3-PF6Z].
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twelve years ago.96 In recent years, fintech firms like Robinhood have
allowed users to buy and sell virtual assets driven by blockchain technology, and big players like PayPal are embracing entry into this market.97 In sub-Saharan Africa, virtual assets and blockchain have the
potential to provide financial infrastructure to “previously underserved and unbanked population segments.”98 In Latin America, distrust in local currencies has increased the adoption of
cryptocurrency.99 And in Asia, payment solution digitalization has facilitated the adoption of blockchain.100 By challenging current financial institutions with decentralization and disintermediation, fintech
escalates the difficulty of regulatory compliance.101 Thus, AML regulators are faced with a serious question: How can fintech regulation
guard against financial risk but still foster innovation?
This Comment examines this question under a three-pronged theory called the “innovation trilemma,” introduced by Professors Chris
Brummer and Yesha Yadav.102 The innovation trilemma is a theoretical framework for examining and understanding fintech regulation.103
Fintech regulators face a policy trilemma among three objectives:
market integrity, rules simplicity, and financial innovation.104 The theory purports that fintech regulators are only able to achieve two out of
these three objectives.105
What do these three objectives mean? Market integrity refers to
overall financial stability, protection against illegal acts, and the supervision of systematically interconnected fintech firms.106 At its core,
maintaining market integrity means guarding against the challenge of
systemic risk.107 Rules simplicity refers to regulators’ aim to create
rules that are comprehensible and easy to apply, while financial innovation refers to regulators’ interest in advancing technologies that
raise capital, diversify risk, and improve market operation.108 Brummer and Yadav exemplify this trilemma through historical U.S. regulatory examples: the 1920s New Deal Era, the 1990s
96. See Sharifi, supra note 55.
97. Brady Dale, Bitcoin Trading Fees on PayPal, Robinhood, Cash App and
Coinbase: What to Know, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-trading-feeson-paypal-robinhood-cash-app-and-coinbase-what-to-know (Nov. 30, 2020, 1:30 PM)
[https://perma.cc/3XK9-HFML].
98. MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 40.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 42.
101. Wu, supra note 7, at 250.
102. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 14, at 244.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 244–45.
107. See discussion supra Section II.A.
108. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 14, at 246–47.
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Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, and the Dodd–Frank Act following the
2008 financial crisis.109
It is important to note that while the innovation trilemma is a theoretical framework, it is taken as true in this Comment’s discussion. In
fact, its efficacy may be bolstered by the examples of AML regulation
given throughout this Comment. Further, for the purposes of this
Comment, the three trilemma objectives are referred to as “market
integrity,” “rules clarity,” and “innovation,” though their meanings
from the preceding paragraph remain unchanged.
2. The Current AML Regulatory Landscape: Local and
International Examples
The three objectives of market integrity, rules clarity, and innovation form an AML regulatory hierarchy. The trade-offs between these
three objectives take shape as AML regulators favor certain objectives over others. As it currently stands in developed countries, AML
regulatory bodies tend to place the objective of market integrity on
top of the hierarchy.110 The same notion rings true for the Financial
Action Task Force (“FATF”)—the most prominent international
AML regulatory body.111 By contrast, developing countries in regions
such as Africa and Latin America have little to no AML regulatory
framework and are thus susceptible to systemic risk.112 The following
regulatory frameworks serve as examples along this hierarchical spectrum. They highlight the need for an international AML regulatory
framework that places paramount importance on innovation while
maintaining market integrity.
In the United States, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (“BSA”) serves
as the principal legislation on AML issues, comprised of certain requirements such as currency transaction reports, reports on the sale of
monetary instruments, and customer identification programs.113 The
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), devoted to safeguarding the financial system from money laundering issues,114 administers the BSA and requires reporting of suspicious transactions,
109. See id. at 249.
110. See Yadav, supra note 35, at 1121–23.
111. See Who We Are, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/
whoweare/ [https://perma.cc/9MP5-TP5L].
112. See Ian Allison, Where FATF Crypto Compliance Gets Interesting: Africa,
COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/where-fatf-crypto-compliance-gets-interestingafrica (Aug. 24, 2021, 6:46 PM) [https://perma.cc/EGC6-XW9B]; see MILLER ET AL.,
supra note 37, at 40.
113. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as
amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1951–59, and in scattered sections of 31
U.S.C.); see Wu, supra note 7, at 223–24, 227–29.
114. What We Do, FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/
37WT-A599].
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cash transactions over $10,000, and other illicit activities.115 Fintech
firms specializing in virtual asset transactions and blockchain technology are subject to this AML regulatory framework.116 The framework
essentially incorporates virtual assets into the already existing BSA
legislation.117
From a hierarchical standpoint, BSA legislation and FinCEN regulators place paramount importance on market integrity. However,
when viewed through the trilemma framework, this leads to a lack of
rules clarity and innovation. Most recently, FinCEN has proposed new
regulations that make it easier for the government to track virtual asset transactions, requiring fintech firms to keep records of transactions
over $3,000 for personal wallets and report cumulative transactions
over $10,000 in a day.118 For comparison, under the BSA, traditional
intermediary banks are only required to flag cash withdrawals exceeding $10,000, not transactions that occur within the banking network
itself.119 Further, the United States has no uniform definition of
“cryptocurrency.”120 Thus, the combination of (1) a lack of a directly
applicable framework and (2) proposed regulations solely focused on
maintaining market integrity leads to a lack of clarity in rulemaking
and a squeeze on financial innovation.121 As a result, fintech firms
may be pushed toward jurisdictions where regulations are clear and
innovation is fostered.122
On a similar note, the U.K. AML regulatory framework focuses on
market integrity but provides more clarity to fintech firms. The United
Kingdom recently implemented the Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019, expanding an already existing framework of preventative measures based on FATF recommendations.123 These regulations define “cryptoassets” as “a
cryptographically secured digital representation of value or contractual rights that uses a form of distributed ledger technology and can
115. What is the BSA Data?, FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/what-bsa-data [https:/
/perma.cc/U2BH-4P28].
116. See Wu, supra note 7, at 233.
117. See id. at 223–29.
118. Leigh Cuen, Bitcoin Advocates Revolt Against the Trump Administration’s
Frantic Crypto Regulations, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 8, 2021, 9:47 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/08/bitcoin-advocates-revolt-against-the-trump-administrationsfrantic-crypto-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/Z8SE-AZ4D]; see Requirements for Certain Transactions Involving Convertible Virtual Currency or Digital Assets, 85 Fed.
Reg. 83,840 (Dec. 23, 2020) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1022).
119. Cuen, supra note 118.
120. Josias N. Dewey, USA, in BLOCKCHAIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION
384, 385 (Josias N. Dewey ed., 3d ed. 2021).
121. Birla, supra note 19.
122. Id.
123. Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019,
SI 2019/1511 (Eng.).
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be transferred, stored, or traded electronically.”124 Further, the U.K.
Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) assumed complete oversight of
virtual-asset fintech firms as of January 10, 2020, requiring that firms
register with the FCA for monitoring and enhanced due diligence.125
While the U.K. AML regulatory framework emphasizes clarity, the
hierarchy of the framework is still markedly similar to that of the
United States—market integrity is the most important objective. But
the objective of innovation is not completely absent. In 2018, the FCA
established the Innovation Division and implemented several initiatives: a regulatory sandbox, the GFIN, and an Innovation Hub.126
However, the burden on fintech firms becomes extremely heavy with
stringent regulations that prompt small, entrepreneurial firms to undertake extreme customer monitoring.127 Maintaining market integrity requires AML regulators to make these types of trade-offs, which
is especially evident when viewed through the lens of the trilemma.
Thus, the objective of innovation is still deficient within the U.K.
AML regulatory hierarchy.
Briefly moving from local to international platforms, the FATF sets
AML recommendations and standards to prevent money laundering
and other illicit activities.128 There are more than 200 FATF member
countries and 40 AML standards that are continually updated to address new risks, such as the regulation of virtual assets.129 Member
countries are peer reviewed on the AML standards through mutual
evaluations to assess implementation levels and technical compliance.130 From a hierarchical standpoint, the FATF standards primarily
focus on market integrity. However, the high number of standards
may reduce clarity; member countries are subject to a very large-scale
assessment. Further, the standards are grouped into categories such as
“money laundering and confiscation,” “terrorist financing and financing of proliferation,” “preventive measures,” “international coopera124. Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019,
SI 2019/1511, § 14A(3) (Eng.).
125. Money Laundering Regulations, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/
firms/financial-crime/money-laundering-regulations (July 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
ZCZ9-S9XH].
126. Stuart Davis et al., United Kingdom, in BLOCKCHAIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY
REGULATION 369, 379 (Josias N. Dewey, 3d ed., 2021).
127. Will Heasman, FCA’s New AML Regime – UK’s Crypto Market Will Have to
Adapt in 2020, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 21, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/fcasnew-aml-regime-uks-crypto-market-will-have-to-adapt-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/
2QFP-83XJ].
128. Who We Are, supra note 111.
129. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING
MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION 10–30
(2021), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/
FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQF4-75KD].
130. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Consolidated Assessment Ratings, (Oct. 2020)
[hereinafter Consolidated Assessment Ratings] http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/4th-Round-Ratings.pdf [https://perma.cc/KBW2-GXKG].
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tion,” etc.131 No category is specifically geared toward the growth of
innovation. As a result, and viewed from the hierarchy, the FATF
places paramount importance on market integrity, but this also produces deficiencies in clarity and promotion of financial innovation.
Local jurisdictions that are subject to FATF monitoring are left to implement their own innovative vehicles.
From a different local viewpoint, there are some jurisdictions that
give little credence to the objectives of market integrity and clarity.
For example, in Africa, P2P payments using digital currencies are becoming an alternative to local fiat currencies.132 Senegal announced
plans for a cryptocurrency under the West African Economic and
Monetary Union, and South Africa’s central bank gives virtual-asset
fintech firms and consumers “relative ‘carte blanche’ to conduct
cryptocurrency transactions.”133 In Latin America, smaller economies
are adopting cryptocurrency and other blockchain financial products.134 In Argentina and Brazil, Ripio—a cryptocurrency company—
has a Bitcoin financial services suite that allows P2P virtual asset
transfers for both unbanked and underbanked populations.135 From a
hierarchical standpoint, the regulators in these regions place the objective of innovation at the top of the hierarchy with little regard for
market integrity or rules clarity. While this system reaches previously
underserved and unbanked populations in developing countries, the
AML regulatory control is “weak or non-existent.”136
The differences in these local and international frameworks seem to
beg a specific question: What is the correct hierarchy to reach fintech
AML regulatory equilibrium? On one hand, local, developed jurisdictions like the United States and the United Kingdom or international
bodies like the FATF have stringent AML regulations that promote
market integrity but leave deficiencies in financial innovation and
market competition. On the other hand, jurisdictions within developing regions like Africa and Latin America are inviting fintech innovation to build their local technological ecosystems but are prone to
financial market shocks because of weak or non-existent AML regulations. Moreover, the biggest problem is that the regulatory consequences in these jurisdictions are not mutually exclusive. Transfers of
capital, especially electronic fund transfers involving virtual assets, are
extremely mobile and implicate strong cross-border financial ramifications.137 As mentioned in the previous discussion of the challenges
fintech regulators face, modern markets are unavoidably global.138
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Allison, supra note 112.
See Yadav, supra note 35, at 1117.
Id. at 1118.
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Therefore, the cross-jurisdictional challenges and the innovative nature of fintech warrant several solutions. First, the need for an international AML regulatory framework is apparent. Second, the hierarchy
of this international regulatory framework needs to place paramount
importance on the innovative nature of the sector while still maintaining market integrity to guard against the challenges of regulating
fintech. The next Part examines this proposed hierarchy.
III. PROPOSAL: A NEW INTERNATIONAL ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING REGULATORY HIERARCHY PREMISED ON
INNOVATION
Why is an international regulatory hierarchy premised on financial
innovation so important? This Part argues that the proposed AML
hierarchy is needed because (1) the fintech sector is inherently innovative, meaning firms will continually seek an avenue for growth despite stringent regulations; and (2) the future uses of blockchain
technology will revolutionize financial transactions and allow emerging/developing markets to gain a global foothold. Further, this Part
promotes the efficacy of the proposed AML hierarchy through an examination of OFC regulatory frameworks, which have fostered fintech
innovation by creating innovative regulatory ecosystems.
A. Why Emphasize Innovation?
The fintech sector is inherently innovative. The exponential rise in
financial applications of blockchain technology in the recent decade
prove this point.139 Because fintech firms possess this innovative nature, they necessarily need room for growth. This can cause a regulatory “race to the bottom” where local regulators promote lower and
lower standards of AML fintech regulation to invite fintech firms to
their jurisdiction.140 This is a result of insufficient international coordination and aggressive competition between regulators to entice innovative businesses.141 Thus, the proposed international regulatory
hierarchy is needed to instead promote a “race to the top,” where
regulators compete to adopt better-designed and more efficient regulations premised on multinational regulatory learning.142
As noted previously, blockchain technology is still often associated
with Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.143 However, innovative uses
of blockchain have increased exponentially since distributed ledger
technology was first introduced.144 Some have even heralded
blockchain as one of the greatest inventions in human history, follow139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See Rawat et al., supra note 20, at 8–14.
Brummer & Yadav, supra note 14, at 296.
Id. at 301.
See Regulating Fintech, supra note 80, at 1223.
See MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 9.
See Rawat et al., supra note 20, at 8–14.
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ing the footsteps of inventions such as the printing press, electricity,
radio, and the Internet.145 That notion is certainly up for debate. But
the point is that the applications of blockchain are undeniable, consisting of the following: financial transactions, cryptocurrency, global payments, insurance processing, “Internet of things,” systems
management, cybersecurity, intellectual property, identity management, and other uses in scenarios involving transaction management
in a P2P system.146 An examination of these specific applications
would require a large-scale discussion outside the scope of this Comment. But suffice it to say the applications of blockchain technology
exemplify the inherently innovative nature of the fintech sector.
Further, the impact blockchain technology can have on emerging
markets cannot be overstated. When blockchain is utilized for financial services, emerging marketplaces can be “‘bootstrapped’ to function without the use of traditional ‘trusted parties’ and thereby result
in significantly lower networking costs for participants.”147 Fintech
firms employing blockchain initiatives in emerging market economies
can expand the value chain of financial services to target inefficiencies
and reach largely underserved customer segments.148 Examples of
fintech firms operating in this manner include BitPesa in Kenya, Remit.ug in Uganda, BitSpark in Hong Kong, Coinsensure in India, and
Rebit in the Philippines.149 However, these developing jurisdictions
need proper governance and a strong regulatory framework to provide stability and allow innovation to flourish.150 Cross-jurisdictional
regulatory harmonization is a mechanism that ensures that these
emerging markets properly engage and collaborate with fintech firms
utilizing blockchain technology.151 Thus, the need for this Comment’s
proposed international regulatory hierarchy is evident to avoid systemic risk in these emerging markets while still allowing for fintech
innovation that advances the financial economy.
The combination of an inherently innovative fintech sector and the
undeniable applications of further developments in fintech innovation
leads to the conclusion that the key objective for regulating the industry is fostering innovation. A regulatory hierarchy premised on innovation is a necessity.

145. See Gareth Jenkinson, Crypto and Blockchain—Following in the Footsteps of
Man’s Greatest Inventions?, COINTELEGRAPH (July 14, 2018), https://
cointelegraph.com/news/crypto-and-blockchain-following-in-the-footsteps-of-man-sgreatest-inventions [https://perma.cc/JZN5-7HR3].
146. Rawat et al., supra note 20, at 8–14.
147. MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 16.
148. Id. at 18.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 51.
151. See id. at 53.
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B. Examining the Efficacy of the Hierarchy: Offshore Financial
Centers
OFCs provide an excellent example to examine the efficacy of the
proposed hierarchy. OFCs are popularly known as “tax havens” that
offer “light-touch regulation,” “where bank secrecy and tax relief are
essential commodities.”152 And recently, these jurisdictions have become leaders in blockchain technology development and have earned
a new moniker: “blockchain havens.”153 This supposition of lighttouch regulation may be true by some accounts; lower transaction
costs in a small number of these jurisdictions allow for effective AML
regulatory competition.154 However, it may be surprising to note that
well-established OFCs have a level of AML regulatory effectiveness
either on par with or close to the effectiveness of onshore jurisdictions.155 As members of the FATF, OFCs are subject to AML regulation assessment and compliance ratings through one of nine FATFstyle regional bodies.156 The most recent FATF assessment rated
Malta, an OFC located in the Mediterranean between Sicily and Tunisia, as “compliant” or “largely compliant” in 31 out of 40 AML recommendations.157 By comparison, the FATF rated the United States as
“compliant” or “largely compliant” in 31 out of its 40 recommendations in its most recent AML assessment.158 Both jurisdictions are
equally compliant with AML measures promoting market integrity.
Thus, to say that these OFCs offer light-touch AML regulation disregards the objective compliance meters espoused by the FATF. This
examination reviews the regulatory frameworks of three well-established OFCs: Malta, Gibraltar, and Jersey. Each of these OFCs invite
financial innovation while still guarding against systemic risk.
Malta is a large OFC that specializes in “corporate and transaction
banking and fund management.”159 Malta recently positioned itself as
a fintech-friendly jurisdiction by introducing a regulatory regime for
virtual asset transactions in 2018, namely, the Virtual Financial Assets
Act 2018 (“VFA Act”).160 The VFA Act defines the term “virtual financial asset” and regulates the issuance of ICOs, blockchain technol152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Marian, supra note 23, at 531–32.
Id. at 532.
See Morriss & Henson, supra note 24, at 426–27.
Id. at 427–28.
See Consolidated Assessment Ratings, supra note 130.
MONEYVAL, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTER-TERRORIST FINANCING MEASURES MALTA 17 (2019), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/Moneyval-Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Malta-2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6RHP-EV9L].
158. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTER-TERRORIST FINANCING MEASURES UNITED STATES, 8 (2020), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/
media/fatf/documents/reports/fur/Follow-Up-Report-United-States-March-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M9L4-BDRS].
159. MONEYVAL, supra note 157, at 9.
160. Id. at 101.
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ogy assets, and licensing related to virtual asset transactions.161 The
Act serves as the primary Maltese AML legislative framework to
guard against systemic risk, regulated by the Malta Financial Services
Authority.162 And as previously noted, Malta was rated “compliant”
or “largely compliant” with 31 out of 40 of the FATF AML
recommendations.163
Moreover, Malta also instituted the Malta Digital Innovation Authority Act (“MDIA Act”) and the Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act (the “ITAS Act”). The MDIA Act establishes
an agency to promote principles “relating to technology innovation,
including distributed or decentralized technology.”164 The ITAS Act
regulates innovative technology arrangements and virtual asset service
providers, which are then overseen by the MDIA.165 In sum, Malta
has affirmatively created legislation and regulation to ensure innovation growth in the fintech sector, with special focus on defined uses of
blockchain technology and virtual asset transactions. From a hierarchical standpoint, fostering innovation is the paramount regulatory
objective. Additionally, the VFA Act still promotes systemic integrity
through a stringent AML regulatory framework. When asked why
Malta instituted these acts, the Digital Economy Parliamentary Secretary Silvio Schembri stated, “We want an eco-system that encourages
operators to move here,” and the legislation and regulation “provide
the necessary legal certainty to allow this industry to flourish.”166
These movements toward financial innovation are not exclusive to
the OFC of Malta. Like Malta, Gibraltar is a self-governed British
OFC situated south of Spain at the tip of the Iberian Peninsula.167 The
OFC has been rated as “compliant” or “largely compliant” with 30 out
of 40 FATF AML recommendations in its last mutual evaluation report.168 In terms of direct AML legislation, Gibraltar instituted the
Proceeds of Crime Act in 2015, which transposed the European Union
Anti-Money Laundering Directive into the national law of Gibraltar.169 This brought virtual asset transactions within existing AML leg161. See Virtual Financial Assets Act, 2018 (Act No. XXX) (Malta).
162. Id.
163. MONEYVAL, supra note 157, at 17.
164. Malta Digital Innovation Authority Act, 2018 (Act No. XXXI) (Malta).
165. See Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act, 2018 (Act No.
XXXIII) (Malta).
166. Ivan Martin, Malta Digital Innovation Authority Unveiled, TIMES OF MALTA
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/malta-digital-innovation-authority-unveiled.670847 [https://perma.cc/GZ6W-RMVU].
167. MONEYVAL, BRITISH OVERSEAS TERRITORY OF GIBRALTAR FIFTH ROUND
MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT 17 (2019) [hereinafter GIBRALTAR REPORT], https://
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/Moneyval-Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Gibraltar.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6Q2-658C].
168. Id. at 15.
169. See Proceeds of Crime Act, 2015 (Act No. 2015-22) (Gib.).
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islation regarding financial issues, such as customer identity
verification and risk assessment.170
Gibraltar has had a regulated blockchain providers’ sector since
2017 with a dedicated blockchain authorization team.171 The government introduced the Financial Services (Distributed Ledger Technology Providers) Regulations 2017, which was repealed and replaced in
2019 by the Financial Services Act to form a more comprehensive regulatory framework.172 The Financial Services Act requires fintech
firms engaging in blockchain activity to apply for a license from the
Gibraltar Financial Services Commission (“GFSC”).173 Further, the
Gibraltar Blockchain Exchange was established in 2018 as an official
GFSC-licensed virtual asset exchange.174 The GFSC’s movement toward blockchain regulation “positions Gibraltar as a jurisdiction
which facilitates innovation” with a “flexible, adaptive approach.”175
The GFSC even established an “Innovate and Create Team” that provides regulatory support to new or non-regulated businesses.176 While
Gibraltar’s regulatory framework may not emphasize innovation to
the same extent as Malta’s, innovation is still exhibited as the paramount hierarchical regulatory objective. Moreover, regulators in Gibraltar remain focused on risk governance and mitigation through
stringent, yet flexible, AML blockchain and virtual asset regulation.
Malta and Gibraltar serve as examples of jurisdictions that use direct legislation and regulation to promote financial innovation. The
last OFC examined in this review, Jersey, serves as an example of a
jurisdiction that promotes innovation through a more principled approach. In fact, there are no specific regulations in Jersey that directly
apply to virtual assets.177 However, Jersey regulators and governmentbacked economic development agencies promote an innovative, open

170. Clare Feikert-Ahalt, Gibraltar, in REGULATORY APPROACHES TO CRYPTOASSELECTED JURISDICTIONS 98, 105, (L. Libr. of Cong. ed., 2019) 105, https://
tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llglrd/2019668148/2019668148.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9K66-S25P]
171. GIBRALTAR REPORT, supra note 167, at 120.
172. See Financial Services (Distributed Ledger Technology Providers) Regulations, 2017 (LN. 2017/204) (Gib.), repealed by Financial Services Act, 2019 (Act No.
2019-26) (Gib.).
173. Id.
174. Feikert-Ahalt, supra note 170.
175. Distributed Ledger Technology Regulatory Framework (DLT Framework),
GIB. FIN. SERVS. COMM’N, https://www.fsc.gi/dlt [https://perma.cc/ESM2-U2WU].
176. Innovate and Create Team, GIB. FIN. SERVS. COMM’N, https://www.fsc.gi/FSC/
innovate [https://perma.cc/93MR-Q88H].
177. Clare Feikert-Ahalt, Jersey, in REGULATORY APPROACHES TO CRYPTOASSETS
IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS 143, 143–44 (L.Libr. of Cong. ed. 2019) [hereinafter Regulatory Approaches to Cryptoassets: Jersey], https://www.tile.loc.gov/storage-services/
service/ll/llglrd/2019668148/2019668148.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K66-S25P].
SETS IN
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attitude to fintech, which in turn has spurred innovative policies, examined in depth below.178
The OFC of Jersey, part of the Channel Islands, is a self-governed
British Crown Dependency off the coast of France.179 Jersey is one of
the most well-established OFCs in the world, with “a mature and sophisticated AML/CFT regime.”180 It was rated “compliant” or
“largely compliant” with 39 out of 40 FATF recommendations in its
last mutual evaluation report,181 the highest score among all jurisdictions assessed in that same evaluation cycle.182 The OFC has applied
its existing legislative framework to virtual asset transactions.183 So
while Jersey does not have specific regulations that apply to virtual
assets and ICOs, certain types of these financial vehicles may be subject to the existing regulatory regime.184 Further, Jersey has defined
“virtual currency” in amendments to the Proceeds of Crime Act, enabling these assets to be subject to AML laws and regulated by the
Jersey Financial Services Commission (“JFSC”).185
Along with its comprehensive AML regulatory regime, Jersey has
numerous organizations that promote innovation in the financial sector, following “a purposeful strategy of transparency, innovation and
quality.”186 Digital Jersey, “an economic development agency and industry association,” develops strategies to help establish Jersey as a
leading base for digital innovation.187 Digital Jersey has partnered
with the government and agency organizations including the Government of Jersey, the JFSC, and Jersey Finance.188 Jersey Finance, an
organization “funded by members of the local finance industry and
the Government of Jersey,” focuses on five pillars in the fintech sector: fintech innovation, regulation technology (“RegTech”),
178. See CHRISTOPHER GRIFFIN ET AL., JERSEY BLOCKCHAIN AND CRYPTOCURREGULATION 2020, (Carey Olsen ed., 2d ed. 2020) https://www.careyolsen.
com/sites/default/files/CO_JSY_Blockchain-and-Cryptocurrency-Regulation-20202nd-Edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y3G-GK9U]. See generally Fintech and Regtech,
DIGIT. JERSEY, https://www.digital.je/initiatives/fintech-regtech/ [https://perma.cc/
V3FJ-YSQM] (explaining that Jersey’s regulatory approach to fintech creates a “compelling environment” for fintech companies).
179. Facts About Jersey, GOV’T OF JERSEY, https://www.gov.je/Leisure/Jersey/
Pages/Profile.aspx [https://perma.cc/A976-7N79].
180. MONEYVAL, REPORT ON FOURTH ASSESSMENT VISIT OF JERSEY 277 (2015),
https://rm.coe.int/report-on-fourth-assessment-visit-anti-money-laundering-and-com
bating-/1680716452 [https://perma.cc/AJ72-A3KG].
181. Id. at 260–68.
182. MONEYVAL Report 2016, JERSEY FIN. (May 31, 2016), https://www.jerseyfi
nance.je/our-work/moneyval-report-2016/ [https://perma.cc/M28G-RQEA].
183. See Regulatory Approaches to Cryptoassets: Jersey, supra note 177, at 144.
184. Id.
185. See Proceeds of Crime (Miscellaneous Amendments) (Jersey) Regulations
2016, R&O.63/2016 (Jersey).
186. MONEYVAL Report 2016, supra note 182.
187. About Digital Jersey, DIGIT. JERSEY, https://www.digital.je/about/ [https://
perma.cc/P72G-AN6G].
188. Fintech and Regtech, supra note 178.
RENCY
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wealthtech, cryptocurrency and blockchain technology, and cybersecurity.189 Jersey’s government has advanced a “balanced approach
towards fintech regulation” in coordination with the JFSC, which ensures market integrity “while giving innovative businesses a pragmatic
space in which to test new products.”190 In sum, the numerous organizations throughout Jersey have a central policy objective to foster innovation in the fintech industry. From a hierarchical standpoint, the
regulatory objective of innovation is paramount, yet the strong AML
regulations of Jersey still promote systemic integrity.
The three OFCs of Malta, Gibraltar, and Jersey highlight the efficacy of this Comment’s proposed regulatory hierarchy. These regulatory frameworks do not necessarily serve as direct models for an
international framework. It would be a difficult task to directly transpose these exact frameworks on a multinational level given global differences in national market structure. Rather, these frameworks
provide clear examples of how local AML regulation geared towards
the objective of innovation and the creation of innovation hubs is extremely effective for growth in the fintech sector. Further, these OFC
frameworks highlight the various ways of placing the objective of innovation in a paramount position. Local legislation and regulation can
directly govern blockchain and virtual asset transactions, similar to the
frameworks of Malta and Gibraltar. Alternatively, and perhaps more
likely, regulatory policy and principle geared towards innovation can
promote the growth of blockchain and virtual asset transactions, similar to the regulatory framework in Jersey. Under either circumstance,
the point remains the same: a regulatory hierarchy with the paramount objective of innovation is needed to govern the inherently innovative fintech sector.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED REGULATORY
HIERARCHY
It will be helpful to recap the questions this Comment has answered
thus far. First, what is fintech, the challenges associated with AML
regulation of fintech, and the current regulatory landscape? Second,
why is an international regulatory hierarchy premised on financial innovation so important, and how has this hierarchy been effective in a
number of OFCs? This Part now turns to a more pertinent question:
How can the proposed regulatory hierarchy be internationally
implemented?
Several implementations have taken shape in the form of regulatory
sandboxes, fintech charters, appointed representative regimes, and
mentorship programs. Application of these strategies can be macroproduced in an international regulatory environment to foster innova189. Id.
190. Id.
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tion and attain the desired hierarchical outcome. However, some of
the current regulatory sandboxes are employed locally and may emphasize narrowly tailored industry innovation at the loss of true regulatory education.191 And mentorship regimes are also local in nature
and currently represent only an ideological arrangement.192 Thus, a
more concrete implementation is warranted.
Future developments must be both local and multinational for implementation of the proposed international AML regulatory hierarchy. The GFIN, an initiative “committed to advancing financial
integrity” through innovation in financial services, has over 40 national financial sector regulatory members.193 This nascent international fintech organization is in the best position as a global
innovation hub to enable further efforts that place more emphasis on
regulatory reporting geared towards innovation. Moreover, the innovation hubs created by OFCs are a lesson for local regulators across
the globe. Partnerships between governmental and innovative agency
organizations will improve AML regulatory transparency, quality, and
innovation. We are currently at a developmental crossroads between
regulatory complacency and a proactive approach that takes the innovative nature of the fintech sector into account. Positive developments
toward the proposed regulatory hierarchy must be fostered to enable
adequate financial development.
A. Regulatory Sandboxes and Stand-Alone Implementations
Regulatory sandboxes are safe spaces for fintech firms to test new
innovations without the fear of strict regulation.194 Specifically, the
goal is to relax existing regulations in a controlled setting, which allows experimentation with new business models or technology.195 This
regulatory environment simultaneously fosters innovation and mitigates risk in financial technology.196 Thus, the regulatory sandbox fits
the proposed hierarchy; innovation is the paramount objective, yet
market integrity is still intact and systemic risk is mitigated.
Several jurisdictions have already employed regulatory sandboxes.
The U.K. FCA created the first regulatory sandbox in 2016.197 A
191. Matthew J. Razzano, An Unsafe Sandbox: Fintech Innovation at the Expense
of Consumer Protection?, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 132, 138 (2019).
192. See Enriques & Ringe, supra note 30, at 22–28.
193. Our Members, GLOB. FIN. INNOVATION NETWORK, https://www.thegfin.com/
members [https://perma.cc/6W46-6P2G]; About GFIN, supra note 34.
194. Piri, supra note 29, at 246.
195. JORGE GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ & MARGARET HAGAN, A REGULATORY SANDBOX
FOR THE INDUSTRY OF LAW (Thomson Reuters ed., 2019), https://wwwcdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Regulatory-Sandbox-for-the-Industry-of-Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ2Z-9SXS].
196. Piri, supra note 29, at 246.
197. Latham & Watkins, World-First Regulatory Sandbox Open for Play in the UK,
CLIENT ALERT COMMENT. (May 9, 2016), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/
LW-world-first-regulatory-sandbox-open-for-play-in-UK [https://perma.cc/P8EZ-
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fintech firm in the FCA sandbox goes through four steps: application,
authorization, testing, and exit.198 These steps allow for regulatory engagement and business development, empowering fintech firms to
fine-tune their business models.199 Regulatory sandboxes allow entrepreneurial fintech firms to innovate and prepare for financial regulation by equalizing opportunities between incumbents and startups.200
Many jurisdictions employ sandboxes at a small, local level. In the
United States, the states of Arizona, Utah, and Wyoming all have active fintech regulatory sandboxes, with Florida close behind.201 At the
U.S. federal level, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has
launched several programs and initiatives like the Trial Disclosure
Sandbox, the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, streamlined no-action
letter policies, and the American Consumer Financial Innovation Network.202 Further, the Monetary Authority of Singapore has also
launched a regulatory sandbox with recent graduates such as the capital markets blockchain platform iSTOX.203
And on a global scale, the U.K. FCA formed GFIN with an early
priority for the development of cross-border testing through a pilot
“global sandbox” initiative.204 After screening 44 applications, GFIN
announced that it would be working with eight fintech firms for crossborder trials in April 2019.205 Based on that experience of collaboration and regulatory learning, GFIN is now committed to developing
the cross-border testing framework in a post-pilot phase.206 A regulatory sandbox indicates a regulator’s inclination to foster innovation,
provides a tangible boost to innovation and competition, and allows
regulators to communicate with fintech firms in an open environment
before systemic risk materializes.207
GSER]; DAVID STRACHAN ET AL., A JOURNEY THROUGH THE FCA REGULATORY
SANDBOX (Deloitte ed., 2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/
Documents/financial-services/deloitte-uk-fca-regulatory-sandbox-project-innovate-finance-journey.pdf [https://perma.cc/N63T-HJAW].
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Can Regulators Foster Financial Innovation and Preserve Consumer Protections?, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Sep. 10, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2020/09/can-regulators-foster-financial-innovationand-preserve-consumer-protections [https://perma.cc/B7BN-JD59].
202. Id.
203. Paul Muir, Singapore Firm Graduates from Regulatory Sandbox, ASIA TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2020), https://asiatimes.com/2020/02/singapore-firm-graduates-from-regulatory-sandbox/ [https://perma.cc/P559-8N4J].
204. GLOB. FIN. INNOVATION NETWORK, CROSS-BORDER TESTING: LESSONS
LEARNED 2 (2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5db7cdf53d173c0e010e8f68/
t/5e1ef8c3c7a87d3abb5c7bc6/1579088083585/ [https://perma.cc/E73C-S2JN].
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Buckley et al., supra note 32, at 71–77.
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However, regulatory sandboxes also have several drawbacks. The
use of sandboxes on a stand-alone basis is not the most effective
method to promote a regulatory culture geared toward innovation.208
On a local level, jurisdictions employing regulatory sandbox programs
are very selective with tight entry conditions that limit fintech start-up
entry.209 Sandbox programs are also relatively short (e.g. six months in
the U.K. FCA program), which may be an insufficient amount of time
for firms to adapt to new regulatory regimes.210 Further, while sandboxes allow regulators to learn from fintech firms and build long-lasting policies, the selective nature of sandbox programs along with the
disparate nature of fintech services could result in significant regulatory learning inconsistencies.211 Thus, national and multinational regulatory sandboxes are only one piece of a complex regulatory puzzle.
Governments have proposed other initiatives to promote fintech innovation. Some jurisdictions have utilized the concept of a fintech
charter, which gives fintech firms a national bank license tailored to
their needs.212 For example, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency first utilized fintech charters in 2018 to cover a variety of
fintech firms.213 However, fintech charters like these have encountered significant legal impediments,214 and many different types of licenses may produce “regulatory arbitrage” by creating different legal
standards for similar types of fintech activities.215 The U.K. FCA has
toyed with another type of initiative: appointed representative regimes, which allow some fintech firms to perform regulated activities
acting as appointed representatives for a principal, directly authorized
firm.216 However, a recent review of these principal firms found that
most had under-developed governance protocols, “including a lack of
effective risk frameworks, internal controls and resources.”217
The FCA has proposed a complementary scheme—the fintech
mentorship program—to deal with perceived limitations of regulatory
208. Id. at 83.
209. Id. at 59.
210. Enriques & Ringe, supra note 30, at 18.
211. See Razzano, supra note 191, at 138–39.
212. Enriques & Ringe, supra note 30, at 19.
213. Lucas Siegmund, A Fintech Charter by Another Name, REGUL. REV. (Nov. 30,
2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/11/30/siegmund-fintech-charter-anothername/#:~:text=the%20fintech%20charter%20gives%20fintechs,burdensome%20web
%20of%20state%20regulations [https://perma.cc/7C96-D69T].
214. See id.
215. Enriques & Ringe, supra note 30, at 20.
216. Appointed Representatives and Principals, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Oct. 23,
2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/appointed-representatives-principals [https://
perma.cc/43NX-J8MS].
217. Review of Principal Firms in the Investment Management Sector, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (May 20, 2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-reviews/
review-principal-firms-investment-management-sector [https://perma.cc/8YWW445Q].
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sandboxes, fintech charters, and appointed representative regimes.218
A mentorship program allows fintech startups to enter the market by
making regulatory licenses part of a partnership agreement between
market incumbents and fintech firms.219 The advantage of this
mentorship program is twofold. The fintech firm is allowed to innovate and is within the supervisory scrutiny of the incumbent.220 Innovation is fostered while systemic risk is mitigated. However, the
mentorship program idea is entirely theoretical at this point, and the
implementation of the program as a stand-alone solution implicates
the jurisdictional difficulties associated with differences in national
market structure.221
Regulatory sandboxes and other innovative initiatives each have
their drawbacks as stand-alone solutions to implement this Comment’s proposed hierarchy. However, these initiatives do not need to
be mutually exclusive. Rather, they can all be parts of one uniform
whole with an innovative regulatory purpose. An entire fintech
ecosystem premised on innovation is needed to truly implement the
proposed hierarchy. Luckily, we already have effective examples of
innovative fintech ecosystems in the context of OFCs.
B. Future Local Developments and International Implementation
Implementation of the proposed hierarchy requires both a local and
an international response, with the latter flowing from the former.
And both require the use of innovation hubs—a scheme allowing a
point of contact for regulated and unregulated fintech firms to engage
with regulators and attain direction on the regulatory conformity of
various financial products.222 From a local perspective, efforts from
“blockchain haven” OFCs and a conglomeration of the stand-alone
efforts mentioned above provide examples of how a local jurisdiction
could implement an innovative culture and, in turn, exact the proposed AML regulatory hierarchy. And from an international perspective, GFIN is in the best position to act as a multinational innovation
hub and platform for implementation of the proposed AML hierarchy
with further efforts geared toward regulatory learning.
An innovation hub differs from stand-alone innovative strategies
because it essentially acts as a “portal”—fintech firms can access regulators to discuss innovations, gain guidance navigating regulatory requirements, and seek adjustments in regulation through firm218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Enriques & Ringe, supra note 30, at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23.
See id. at 27.
EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTHS., FINTECH: REGULATORY SANDBOXES AND INNOVATION HUBS 7 (2018), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/jc_
2018_74_joint_report_on_regulatory_sandboxes_and_innovation_hubs.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7AHQ-T632].
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regulator coordination.223 Innovation hubs do the real work of promoting and facilitating jurisdictional fintech innovation while standalone initiatives, like regulatory sandboxes, are just one tool in the
hub’s repertoire to attract fintech market attention.224 The jurisdictions that have been the most successful in innovative efforts have
implemented some form of innovation hub, as exemplified by
“blockchain haven” OFCs.225 Jersey’s innovation hub is the best example of an easily employable framework because the OFC has managed to promote innovation without specific regulations that apply to
virtual assets.226 Rather, innovative organizations like Digital Jersey
have partnered with the local Jersey government to develop strategies
that promote innovative regulatory policy.227 The local government’s
culture of innovation, competition, and regulatory learning thus spurs
the use of initiatives like regulatory sandboxes, fintech charters, etc. to
create an innovative ecosystem.
Transposition of this innovation hub framework to the current U.S.
regulatory framework should be helpful to elucidate the point of local
implementation of the proposed hierarchy. As previously stated, some
states have taken efforts to implement a regulatory sandbox, and the
U.S. government has launched several initiatives, such as the American Consumer Financial Innovation Network, to promote fintech innovation.228 A number of U.S. regulatory agencies have also joined
GFIN.229 While these are steps in the right direction, more is needed
to genuinely foster innovation. These initiatives send a message of
openness to the fintech market, but the facilitation of local regulatory
learning is lacking.230 The United States needs to make regulatory
staff available to interact with the fintech industry, assist with guidance to fintech startups navigating regulations, and issue dispensation of regulatory requirements.231 Affirmative partnerships between
regulatory agencies and organizations promoting fintech innovation—
such as the partnerships in Jersey—are needed to create a true innovation hub. Only then can regulatory agencies truly learn how to accurately mitigate systemic risk and foster the inherently innovative
fintech sector. And the same notion goes for any other local jurisdic223. See Buckley et al., supra note 32, at 58–59.
224. Id. at 59.
225. See discussion supra Section III.B.
226. See Regulatory Approaches to Cryptoassets: Jersey, supra note 177, at 143–48
(discussing the lack of specificity of existing regulations as they apply to virtual
assets).
227. See discussion supra Section III.B.
228. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
229. Press Release, SEC, U.S. Financial Regulatory Agencies Join the Global Financial Innovation Network (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/
2019-221 [https://perma.cc/M6DV-V3XX].
230. See Buckley et al., supra note 32, at 78.
231. See id. at 59.
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tion. An innovation hub centered on regulatory learning is the necessary step towards truly innovative legal and regulatory action.
On an international level, GFIN is in the best position as a multinational innovation hub to implement the proposed hierarchy moving
forward. GFIN “was created to provide a more efficient way for innovative firms to interact with regulators” through cooperation between
financial service regulators working on innovative topics.232 Along
with its cross-border “global sandbox” program, it also has special
units dedicated to supervisory technology (“SupTech”), RegTech, and
a Regulatory Reporting Special Unit.233 The Regulatory Reporting
Special Unit has an objective to “share knowledge and learnings to
inform regulatory reporting approaches” and “plan future regulatory
collaborations.”234 Jurisdictions that participate in GFIN would be
given the tools to navigate AML regulation by learning about compliance and relevant legal frameworks, which would in turn spur innovation. What’s more, GFIN has noted that the next steps include
formalizing cross-border testing, creating cross-jurisdictional tests for
supervisory technologies that facilitate firm compliance, and supporting emerging regulatory markets with their approach to fintech
innovation.235
While GFIN is barely two years old, this movement towards regulatory learning in an international innovation hub will help regulators
develop cross-jurisdictional approaches to fintech innovation. And
both developed and developing jurisdictions can also learn from each
other to advance fintech regulation and innovation. For example, jurisdictions in Africa and Latin America would benefit greatly from
regulatory cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom,
or an OFC.236 Further efforts by local regulators to support GFIN and
similar innovative initiatives will result in implementation of the proposed hierarchy, which will promote consistency, transparency, and
cooperation.237
Fintech innovation is not going away any time soon. We are at a
juncture between regulatory complacency and a proactive approach
that takes the innovative nature of the fintech sector into account. The
promotion of innovation hubs locally and internationally—an imple232. About GFIN, supra note 34.
233. GLOB. FIN. INNOVATION NETWORK, REGTECH & SUPTECH WORKSTREAM
UPDATE 4 (2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5db7cdf53d173c0e010e8f68/t/
601d7c09cbd7bc3255b685bf/1612545036876/GFIN_RegTech_SupTech_Work
stream_Update+-+Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/42TS-7NWB].
234. Id.
235. GLOB. FIN. INNOVATION NETWORK, GFIN – ONE YEAR ON 11 (2019), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/5db7cdf53d173c0e010e8f68/t/5dbfaaca6b4e151deddc
42ae/1572842207667/GFIN-One-year-on-FINAL-20190612+%28CLEAN+VERSION
%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGY2-VAKM].
236. See discussion supra Sections II.B.2, III.B.
237. See EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., supra note 222, at 5.
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mentation of this Comment’s proposed AML regulatory hierarchy—is
needed to create a pro-innovation ecosystem geared towards future
fintech development.
V. CONCLUSION
Fintech is altering the landscape of the financial market. Virtual asset transaction providers and blockchain technology provide a disintermediating, decentralized alternative to the traditional bank
intermediary. Fintech firms utilizing blockchain are characterized by
several features: they are often entrepreneurial in nature; they rely on
algorithmic functions; and they can easily adapt in response to external circumstances. And these features present several challenges to
regulators: guarding against systemic risk, protecting consumers, and
maintaining global financial stability. Further, the negative consequences of these challenges run across borders into jurisdictions with
different national market structures. AML regulators need an international solution to deal with an international problem.
The innovation trilemma provides a backdrop to understanding
these AML regulations. Regulators are only able to achieve two out
of three objectives: market integrity, rules simplicity/clarity, and fostering innovation. These three objectives form a regulatory hierarchy.
Current local regulatory frameworks tend to place paramount focus
on market integrity and squeeze out innovation. There needs to be an
international AML regulatory hierarchy that is premised on innovation yet still provides global market integrity. Risk is at the heart of
any financial innovation. Technological progress in the financial industry must be allowed to proceed with proactive safeguards for unanticipated consequences because the fintech sector is inherently
innovative. And in the long run, capital markets will function better
and underserved populations can gain access to those markets.
International implementation of the Comment’s proposed AML
regulatory hierarchy requires both a local and global response. Innovation hubs represent the most feasible avenue for implementation.
Locally, partnerships between innovative organizations and local governments can promote a policy of innovation. And the innovation hub
can employ initiatives such as regulatory sandboxes, fintech charters,
appointed representative regimes, and mentorship programs to promote regulatory learning. Globally, GFIN is in the best position to act
as an international innovation hub to promote regulatory learning on
an inter-jurisdictional level. As fintech innovation continues to grow
at a rapid pace, implementation of the proposed hierarchy premised
on innovation is imperative for global financial growth and
competition.
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